Joseph E. Stiglitz is a Nobel-winning economist who served seven years as chairman of President Clinton's Council of Economic Advisors and as chief economist at the World Bank. His book undertakes a highly successful in-depth account of global economic policy. Based on his on-the-frontlines insight adn experience, he rails against how the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other major institutions put the interests of the financial community ahead of those of the developing nations.

Stiglitz details the 1997 Asian economic crisis, the transition of the East European and Russian economies, and how development programs throughout the world were poorly formulated and implemented to the detriment of those poorer nations that followed the prescriptions given to them. He describes how, time and time again, purely free-market ideological economic models were used to design and dictate policies - usually with devastating results. He saw first-hand how undemocratic these major institutions of globalization were, due to their unparalleled secrecy that magnified mistakes (often unacknowledged by the IMF) and inhibited needed changes.

This book, through Stiglitz's detailed experiences, shows clearly why developing nations feel they are on an ever-increasing uphill treadmill leading to default, social and political unrest, or ruined economies, or all three. His over-riding message is that the IMF must "return to its original mandate of providing funds for aggregate demand in countries facing an economic recession." In other words, implement economic expansion and not contraction policies. Too often, the IMF has instituted contractionary policies to "help" developing nations weather recessions, while developed nations typically institute expansionary policies during their recessionary periods.

He offers seven fixes for the system as practiced by the IMF and other global financial institutions:

1. Recognize the danger of "capital market liberalization" and short-term "capital flows." Don't depend on the often-debunked ideology espousing the market totally righting itself without help.

2. Undertake bankruptcy reforms. Don't provide giant bailouts primarily for the benefit of developed nations' creditors at the expense of developing nations' peoples.

3. Use less reliance on bailouts. Bailouts that, for the developed nations' creditors, encourage poor lending practices and provide exchange rate risk protection, while at the same time increase developing nations' indebtedness.

4. Improve banking regulations. Don't force western-style economic reforms on countries that don't even have basic banking rules and laws and therefore have no protections in place.

5. Improve risk management. Exchange rate risk is critical to developing nations; developed nations can provide some mitigation by having creditors absorb the risk of large interest rate fluctuations and by creating insurance markets to help the developing nations manage this risk.

6. Improve safety nets. Many developing nations do not have any adequate unemployment insurance, so their people are particularly hard hit when markets are suddenly opened up and they can't compete right away.

7. Improve crisis response. It must be recognized that social and political turmoil can easily be a consequence of reforms imposed by global financial institutions such as the IMF. Capital will not be attracted to these developing nations due to fear of unrest caused primarily by excessive attention to outside investors and essentially none to domestic employment impacts.